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In addition to the direct sanitary damage of a terrorist attack caused by biological weapons,
the consequences of the massive stockpiling and consumption of antimicrobial agents in
order to treat or prevent the disease under a potential epidemic due to pathogenic bacteria
must also be considered. Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis and Yersinia pestis are the
bacteria most likely to be used as terrorist weapons. Tetracyclines, quinolones and ami-
noglycoside are the antibiotics of choice against these microorganisms. The recent terrorist
attack with anthrax spores in the USA caused a substantial increase in the sales of cipro-
floxacin, as thousands of citizens received antibiotic prophylaxis for either confirmed or
suspected exposure to anthrax, and many others stockpiled antibiotic supplies at their
homes under a panicscenario. The massive consumption of antimicrobial drugsmay lead to
the selection of antibiotic resistant strains, and to the appearance of undesirable side effects,
such as anaphylaxis or teratogenesis.
National health authorities must develop realistic protocols in order to detect, treat and
prevent mass casualties caused by biological weapons. An antibiotic stockpile has to
be planned and implemented, and home stockpiling of antibiotics must be strongly dis-
couraged.
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Biological terrorism has unique characteristics that
make it different from other kinds of war. The reac-
tion of the population to conventional terrorist
attacks (e.g. bombs) is unfortunately well known
and, to some extent, predictable. Such attacks are
readily detected by the authorities, and the injured
receive immediate medical care. The consequences
of a massive attack with a biological weapon may be
dramatically different. The release of microorgan-
isms or their toxins is silent, and detection of the
epidemic is not possible until significant numbers of
people with the disease are assisted at medical
facilities; moreover, the affected patients may be
farfromthegeographiclocationwherethebiological
weapon hasbeen used,andthe agentmayhave been
disseminated in different locations. As time passes,
transmission of the agent may cause the appearance
of secondary cases, confusing the situation even
more. The initial consequences of the attack will
depend on the infectivity, virulence, lethality and
contagiousness of the infective agent. Infection con-
trol measures will be decisive in limiting the out-
break, and they begin with communication of
the risks to the population in order to avoid panic
reactions. Prompt implementation of quarantine
precautions and administration of vaccines and
antimicrobials to the exposed population are essen-
tial in avoiding further spread of the disease [1,2].
In a theoretical situation, once the attack is
detected, and a first estimation of the magnitude
of the disease has been made, coordination of the
public health resources is mandatory, and evalua-
tion of the availability of hospitals and clinics, staff
and pharmaceutical products is a basic step in the
design of the emergency plan. In a conventional
terrorist event, there is no doubt which people are
injured by the weapons. In a bioterrorist attack,
however, unaffected civilians may overwhelm the
medical facilities because of panic, minor symp-
toms due to coincidental diseases, or fear that they
are suffering from the disease. In this situation,
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massive personal stockpiling and consumption of
antibiotics to prevent the disease may have incal-
culable consequences [3].
Among the potential biological weapons, cate-
gory A agents are those most likely to cause mass
casualties, because of their infectivity and viru-
lence. This category includes three pathogenic
bacteria that have the highest potential for use
in large-scale bioterrorist attacks: Bacillus anthracis,
Francisella tularensis and Yersinia pestis [4]. The
antibiotics of choice in the treatment and preven-
tion of these agents, according to the Working
Group on Civilian Biodefense, are summarized
in Table 1 [5–7]. Doxycycline, fluoroquinolones
and streptomycin are the antibiotics that must
be considered in the prevention and treatment
of these conditions. Other bacteria that could be
used as weapons, such as Coxiella burnetti, Brucella
spp., Burkholderia mallei, Vibrio cholerae, Salmonella
spp., Shigella dysenteriae or Escherichia coli 0157:H7,
are less likely to be disseminated widely, have less
lethality, and are therefore placed in category B [4].
In the case of exposure to Bacillus anthracis
spores, 60 days of an antibiotic regimen that
includes either doxycycline or a quinolone is
recommended. The delayed transformation of
the inhaled spores to vegetative bacteria explains
why the antibiotic regimen must be extended up to
60 days after exposure [5,8]. Recent experience in
the USA was that no patient exposed to anthrax
spores receiving antibiotic prophylaxis developed
the disease [9]. Scientific evidence on the efficacy
of antimicrobial prevention of tularemia and pla-
gueisscarce.For tularemia, streptomycinis themost
active antibiotic, and, to date, most authorities have
recommended preemptive streptomycin (gentami-
cin can be used instead) as first choice after acciden-
tal laboratory exposure to this agent [10]. The
aminoglycoside antibiotics have to be given parent-
erally, are ototoxic and nephrotoxic, and so seem to
be unsuitable for mass prophylaxis. Although the
efficacy of ciprofloxacin and doxycycline in humans
for an aerosol challenge of F. tularensis is unknown,
an experimental mouse model indicates that, when
initiated early, they may be effective as post-expo-
sure prophylaxis [11].
In the case of plague, streptomycin is the most
active drug, and is the antibiotic of choice in the
treatment of severe cases [12,13]. Doxycycline is
preferred for prophylaxis, although ciprofloxacin,
chloramphenicol and co-trimoxazole may also be
effective [14,15]. The required duration of prophy-
laxis against Y. pestis and F. tularensis is unknown;
because they are not spore-forming bacteria, a short
course (7–14 days) should be enough for most
attacks. Pneumonic plague is capable of being trans-
mitted by inhalation from person to person; in a
situation in which an established epidemic makes
human-to-human transmission possible, besides
quarantine and barrier measures [16], antimicrobial
prophylaxis may well have to be prolonged.
Insummary, inordertobepreparedforapotential
bacterial attack due to any of these three species,
governments should guarantee a sufficient supply
of tetracyclines, quinolones and streptomycin. The
authorities must, however, keep in mind that the
threatofattackwithantibiotic-resistantmicroorgan-
isms may make this antibiotic choice completely
useless; the recent isolation of a Y. pestis strain with
plasmid-mediated multiresistance in Madagascar
Table 1 Recommendations for antimicrobial therapy following bioterrorist bacterial attacks (Working Group on Civilian
Biodefense)
Treatment Post-exposure prophylaxis
Anthrax Ciprofloxacin for 60 days Ciprofloxacin for 60 days
Penicillin G for 60 days Amoxicillin for 60 days
Doxycycline for 60 days Doxycycline for 60 days
Yersinia pestis Streptomycin for 10 days Doxycycline for 7 days
Gentamicin for 10 days Ciprofloxacin for 7 days
Doxycycline for 10 days Chloramphenicol for 7 days
Chloramphenicol for 10 days
Ciprofloxacin for 10 days
Francisella tularensis Streptomycin for 10 days Doxycycline for 14 days
Gentamicin for 10 days Ciprofloxacin for 14 days
Doxycycline for 14–21 days
Chloramphenicol for 14–21 days
Ciprofloxacin for 10 days
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[17,18] is worrisome, and introduction of resistance
and virulence genes into these pathogenic bacteria
through bioengineering may well be achieved by
military or terrorist-allied laboratories.
P R E P A R E D N E S S A G A I N S T
B I O L O G I C A L T E R R O R I S M : T H E
A N T I B I O T I C S T O C K P I L E
Public-health plans, in order to be prepared
against the release of any of the previously men-
tioned microbiological weapons, must, of course,
include an estimate of the types and quantities of
vaccines and antibiotics that must be stockpiled by
the health authorities. This is not, however, an easy
task, as the dynamics of transmission of these
diseases in an artificial setting caused by the inten-
tional spread of the infectious agent through ter-
rorist action may be very different from what we
know about the biology of the microorganisms in
the natural environment. In 1970, the World
Health Organization estimated that the aerial
release of 50 kg of anthrax spores over a popula-
tion area of five million people would harm
250 000, and that 100 000 people would be expected
to die without treatment; 50 kg of F. tularensis in a
similar area would cause disease in 250 000, and
19 000 deaths, and 50 kg of Y. pestis would cause
150 000 cases of pneumonic plague and 36 000
deaths [19]. Although the scientific basis of these
estimates has not been clearly described in the
literature, the assumption may not be unreason-
able, as was shown by the consequences of the
accidental leak of anthrax from a military facility in
Sverdlovsk, in the former USSR [20]; this uninten-
tional release of a non-specified quantity of Bacillus
anthracis spores was responsible for at least 64
human deaths. How feasible it is to obtain large
quantities of anthrax spores or other pathogens in
some kind of dry powder suitable for massive aero-
solization is something that only military research-
ers or bioterrorist scientists can determine. If the
menace of an airborne massive attack with virulent
F. tularensis, Y. pestis or Bacillus anthracis is real, the
threatened governments should stockpile millions
of doses of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones. The
list of potential biological agents is so large that it is
impossible to keep large stocks of every vaccine,
antiserum or antibacterial to off-set every agent that
may be used in a biological attack.
The pharmaceutical companies should also be
queried about their capacity to manufacture the
drugs upon demand. The recent US experience
with the terrorist attacks using anthrax spores sent
through the mail is particularly helpful as a guide
on how to approach future bioterrorist events. As
of 14 November, the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) reported 22 anthrax cases in several dis-
tricts (Columbia, Florida, New Jersey, New York
City) and five fatalities due to inhalation disease.
Most cases occurred among persons with known
or suspected contact with opened letters contami-
nated with Bacillus anthracis spores [9]. Approxi-
mately 32 000 people initiated antimicrobial
prophylaxis following potential exposure to Bacil-
lus anthracis at workplaces in the affected districts,
and approximately 7500 specimens were sent for
Bacillus anthracis testing [21]. It is obvious that
thousands of other citizens might have received
antibiotic prophylaxis without the CDC’s knowl-
edge, and that many others might have stockpiled
ciprofloxacin at home. The sales of ciprofloxacin in
the USA increased by 12% during the period of the
anthrax attack, in comparison with the preceding
year. The possibility of a large-scale attack caused a
patent dispute between the US and Canadian gov-
ernments and Bayer, the manufacturer of ciproflox-
acin. The US government authorities calculated a
need for antibiotics for ten million persons. For a 60-
daysupply,Bayer’scapacitytomanufactureenough
ciprofloxacin was clearly insufficient. Several gen-
eric companies received Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) clearance under a special legal
framework, the rule 28 USC 1498, so that they could
be asked to manufacture the drug for the govern-
ment without a license from Bayer.
T H E T H R E A T O F A N T I B I O T I C
R E S I S T A N C E
The link between antibiotic use and the develop-
ment of resistance has been well known since the
discovery of penicillin more than 50 years ago [22].
Obviously, one of the dangers of the widespread
use of antibiotics for the prevention or treatment of
infections due to biological weapons is the selec-
tion and community spread of resistant bacteria.
The use of antimicrobial agents in food animals for
growth promotion is an excellent, although unfor-
tunate, experimental model of selection of resis-
tant strains, and explains the high rate of
antimicrobial resistance in Salmonella and Campy-
lobacter strains isolated from human sources [23].
In the case of the quinolones, resistance in E. coli
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has increased in many countries in the last decade,
in close relation to the rising use of this antibiotic in
the treatment of urinary tract infections and as
prophylaxis in neutropenic and cirrhotic patients
[24]. The use of trimethoprim–sulfamethoxazole in
AIDS patients as prophylaxis against Pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia has also been linked to the
development of resistance; in a report from San
Francisco General Hospital, resistance of E. coli
isolated from HIV patients increased from 24%
in 1988 to 74% in 1995 [25]. In a scenario of indis-
criminate use of fluoroquinolones, not only is the
selection of resistant strains among Gram-negative
bacteria worrisome, but also, the dissemination of
quinolone-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae in the
community may compromise therapeutic options
in the treatment of respiratory infections in areas
with high endemicity of penicillin-resistant pneu-
mococci. In the last 5 years, several publications
from different countries have reported an increas-
ing prevalence of fluoroquinolone resistance in S.
pneumoniae, in parallel with prescriptions of this
group of antibiotics [26–28]. In a survey of S.
pneumoniae isolates collected during the year
2000 in Hong Kong, the prevalence of fluoroqui-
nolone resistance (levofloxacin MIC 4 mg/L)
was 13.3%. Fluoroquinolone resistance was asso-
ciated with old age and chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease, and a history of previous
quinolone therapy was common among the people
harboring resistant strains [29]. In a recent Spanish
survey, no strains of S. pneumoniae with an MIC for
ciprofloxacin 4 mg/L were found among 125
pneumococcal strains isolated from children; on
the contrary, 59 of 988 (6%) strains from adults
were resistant. As children are seldom treated with
fluoroquinolones, this finding suggests a link
between fluoroquinolone consumption and devel-
opment of resistance [30]. Undoubtedly, although
the development of reduced susceptibility to fluor-
oquinolones in S. pneumoniae requires sequential
mutations in the antibiotic target, massive con-
sumption of fluoroquinolones as a result of a
bioterrorist attack may definitely contribute to a
significant increase in the prevalence of quinolone-
resistant bacteria in the affected areas.
The tetracyclines inhibit protein synthesis by
reversible binding on the 30S ribosome. Efflux-
based mechanisms are the principal means of
resistance to the tetracyclines, and most frequently
they are plasmid encoded. The tetracyclines are
the drugs of choice for rickettsiae, chlamydiae,
borreliae, and brucellae [31]. Although antibiotic
treatment may contribute to the selection and
spread of tetracycline-resistant bacteria, at the
present time few strains of Pneumococcus, Staphy-
lococcus and Gram-negative bacilli are susceptible
to the tetracyclines, and therefore they are not first-
choice agents for the treatment of infections due to
these microorganisms. The ecological effect of the
use of doxycycline for mass prophylaxis may
therefore not have long-term adverse therapeutic
consequences.
Personal stockpiling of antibiotics must always
be discouraged, even in the face of a bioterrorist
threat. If people accumulate antibiotics at home,
and the anticipated exposure does not take place, it
is probable that they will later misuse the stocked
antibiotics for the treatment of other medical con-
ditions, such as self-limited viral infections or
uncomplicated bacterial infections.
A N T I B I O T I C T O X I C I T Y
Antibiotic recommendations in a mass casualty
setting must be carefully devised, in order to avoid
agents with potential life-threatening secondary
effects, such as severe hypersensitivity reactions
or anaphylaxis, fulminant hepatitis, or exfoliative
skin rash [32]. The teratogenic potential of the
drugs must also be considered in this circum-
stance, as women of childbearing age may be
treated in the first weeks of conception without
knowledge of being pregnant. In any case, the
therapeutic decisions must find a balance between
the toxicity of the drugs against the benefits of
preventive therapy for a potentially lethal infec-
tion.
The toxicity profiles of the quinolones and of
doxycycline are summarized in Table 2. The post-
marketing studies of the newer quinolones (tema-
floxacin, grepafloxacin, trovafloxacin) identified
severe adverse effects such as anaphylactoid reac-
tions, hemolytic anemia, QT-interval prolongation
and liver necrosis [33]. The older quinolones—
ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and levofloxacin—have
not been associated with these adverse events,
except for anecdotal anaphylactoid reactions due
to ciprofloxacin reported in the literature [34]. Fluor-
oquinolones are not recommended for women
during pregnancy, lactation or for young children,
because of concerns about teratogenesis and carti-
lage toxicity. Animal models using high doses of
ciprofloxacin, and surveys of mothers exposed to
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ciprofloxacin during pregnancy, have not shown
that ciprofloxacin causes maternal toxicity, embry-
otoxicity, or teratogenic effects. Quinolones have
been reported to cause arthropathy in immature
animalsofvariousspecies[35,36].Fluoroquinolones
have been used successfully as second-line therapy
in children with severe or multiresistant infections,
although causing reversible arthropathy in some
children with cystic fibrosis.
Doxycycline is the preferred tetracycline,
because of its activity, safety profile and pharma-
cokinetic properties. Hypersensitivity reactions
are rare, and photosensitivity is less frequent with
doxycycline than with other tetracyclines. Liver
toxicity has been described, especially in patients
receiving intravenous tetracyclines; pregnant
patients are particularly susceptible to liver dis-
ease. Doxycycline-induced liver disease is excep-
tional. Pancreatitis has also been linked to
tetracycline treatment.
Tetracyclinesarealsocontraindicatedinpregnant
patients and in young children, because of dental
staining, enamel hypoplasia, and inhibition of ske-
letal growth in the fetus. The Hungarian Congenital
Abnormality Registry failed to detect any terato-
genic risk in a case–control study of 32 804 pregnant
women, 63 of them treated with doxycycline [37].
Doxycycline undergoes less binding to calcium than
do other tetracyclines, and may cause dental
changes less frequently in children.
Streptomycin and gentamicin are aminoglyco-
side antibiotics that have to be administered par-
enterally; they may cause irreversible cochlear and
vestibular damage. Hypersensitivity reactions are
uncommon. In the context of a bioterrorist attack
setting, they should be reserved for the therapy of
patients with severe plague or tularemia. Oral
agents are better choices for large-scale post-expo-
sure prophylaxis.
C O N C L U S I O N
Biological terrorism should no longer be consid-
ered as a hypothetical danger; the threat is real,
and public-health systems must be prepared for a
rapid and efficacious response. In the case of
bacterial biological weapons, B. anthracis, F. tular-
ensis and Y. pestis are most likely to be implicated.
Governments must endorse national plans for
the detection, treatment and prevention of mass
casualties due to these organisms. National
stockpiles of doxycycline, fluoroquinolones and
aminoglycosides are needed, and pharmaceutical
manufacturers must be ready to produce sufficient
quantitities of antimicrobials in the event of a
massive bioterrorist attack. Personal stockpiling
should be discouraged, in order to avoid misuse
and shortage of antibiotics. The massive use of
antimicrobials in this setting may eventually lead
to an increase in the prevalence of resistant bac-
teria in the community. Recommendations and
guidelines for the treatment and prevention of
infections due to biological weapons must also
take into account the cost, effectiveness and side-
effects of the selected vaccines and antimicrobials.
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